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Narrowing Down Education




1 At least since the Lisbon Memorandum on Lifelong Learning (EU 2000), European education
has  been  increasingly  framed  in  terms  of  a  neoliberal  rallying  cry.  This  “neoliberal
cascade” (Connell 2013) has widely affected education and schooling in Europe, pushing
educational  institutions  and  processes  and  even  what  we  may  call  “educational
subjectivities” (of both teachers and students) towards a significant transformation (Ball
2003). Such a transformation – and this is my point – is anything but benign: it implies a
lack,  if  not  an  eclipse,  of  invaluable  educational  features  such  as  critical  agency,
democratic  sharing among all  the actors  of  educational  processes  and practices,  and
meaning creation.  In my paper,  I  wish to address this  issue in the light of  Deweyan
thought and educational philosophy, mainly in reference to his masterpiece Democracy
and Education.  In particular,  I  focus on a)  the well-known Deweyan understanding of
democracy as “a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (MW 9:
93);1 and  b)  on  meaning  creation  and  its  relationship  to  educational  processes  and
practices. As we know, Dewey related the growth and wealth of democracy to “varied
points of shared common interest,” “mutual interests” and “freer interaction between
social  groups”  (MW 9:  92).  Importantly,  such features  are  not  only  basic  features  of
democracy but are also, according to the Deweyan challenge to any form of dualism,
means  of  pursuing individual  and collective  growth.  The failure  to  recognise  such a
transactional  relationship  results  in  an impoverished conception of  education at  the
individual  and  collective  levels  –  and  indeed,  such  a  division  between the  lives  of
individuals and the life of community does not make sense within a Deweyan framework.
Thus, I wish to argue that only through a different conception of education, one in which
education is not rationed, individualised or commodified, do we find the clear sense of
“unattained possibilities” (LW 1: 143) that in turn make living worthwhile. I also argue
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that the EU framework on education is inconsistent in that it is not able to fulfil its own
goals.
2 This paper is organised into three sections. In the first section, I analyse key documents
in European educational politics. Starting with the Lisbon Memorandum on Lifelong Learning
and continuing with Europe 2020 and Rethinking Education, I explicate basic features of the
European framework on education and argue why and how it is actually problematic. In
this section, I also engage with critical literature on what we may call the neoliberal turn
in education. In the second and third sections, I specifically address what I see as the
main  weaknesses  of  the  EU  framework  on  education  while  suggesting  a  different
perspective on educational processes. More specifically, in the second section, I address
the  EU  propensity  to  conceive  of  education  as  adaptation  –  both  individuals  and
educational systems are, in the EU’s words, expected to “adapt [to] the demands of the
knowledge society” (European Council 2000: § 25). In the third section, I discuss the EU’s
tendency toward the individuation and atomisation of educational practices,  whereby
educational  actors  –  individuals  as  well  as  institutions  –  are  viewed as  isolated  and
distinct  elements,  each  pursuing  their own  goals.  Finally,  I  argue  that  these  two
tendencies – adaptation and atomisation – taken together entail a narrowing down of the
democratic  and  ethical  dimensions  of  educational  processes  and  practices.  In  other
words,  these  tendencies  become  a  threat  to  democracy  when  they  are  imposed  on
schooling and education.
 
1. How Does the EU Conceive of Education?
3 Although the history of European co-operation on educational policy dates back to the
early 1960s, the impact and scope of this cooperation “has moved with increased velocity
in recent years” (Lawn & Lingard 2002: 290). According to Lawn and Lingard, “like an
emerging behemoth, the European area of education policy has gradually involved more
and more system administrators  in national  agencies,  cities  and regions” (Ibid.:  290).
Importantly, such influential processes has affected the educational system at all scales,
from the Continental to the national and regional levels;  even individual schools and
teachers are required to conform to the EU framework on education (Lawn & Lingard
2002; Ball 2003; Clarke 2012; and Connell 2013). 
4 Several scholars have discussed this effect,  and EU gestures have been described and
labelled in various ways, ranging from those of “creeping extension” (Field 1998: 26) to
“covert  activity”  (Ryba 1992:  11)  and even to  cases  of  “semi-clandestine  perversion”
(No’voa 2000: 33).2 Criticisms of this underlying educational framework have also been
raised in the fields of educational philosophy and theory and mainly highlight the narrow
view of  education emerging from such a framework and its  undemocratic  effects  on
education and schooling (cf. Burbules & Torres 2000; Biesta 2006, 2015a, 2015b; Simons
2006;  and  Masschelein  &  Simons  2008).  It  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  paper  to
comprehensively analyse the bulk of scholarly work on this issue – not least because such
criticisms  belong  to  a  broad  variety  of  conceptual  frameworks  and  perspectives;
nevertheless, some engagement is required for my own purposes. In this section I shall
focus on what I believe are the most critiqued effects of the neoliberal framework on
educational policies, and I show how EU educational policies penetrate such a framework.
More  specifically,  I  wish  to  show  how  the  EU  educational  framework  exhibits  the
following: a) a strong orientation towards adaptation and a definite view of education as a
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means  of  human  capital  formation:  both  individuals  and  educational  systems  are
expected to adapt “to the demands of the knowledge society” (European Council 2000:
§ 25);  and  b)  an  individuation  or  atomisation  of  educational  practices,  whereby
educational  actors  –  individuals  as  well  as  institutions  –  are  viewed as  isolated  and
distinct  elements,  each one pursuing its  own path and eclipsing the democratic  and
ethical dimensions of educational processes and practices. In making my point, let me
begin with the introductory statement of what is known as the Lisbon Memorandum on
Lifelong Learning. I quote three significant passages and then provide my comments:
The European Council held in Lisbon in March 2000 marks a decisive moment for
the direction of policy and action in the European Union. Its conclusions affirm that
Europe has indisputably moved into the Knowledge Age, with all that this will imply
for cultural, economic and social life. Patterns of learning, living and working are
changing apace. This means not simply that individuals  must adapt to change,  but
equally that established ways of doing things must change too. The conclusions of
the Lisbon European Council confirm that the move towards lifelong learning must
accompany  a  successful  transition  to  a  knowledge-based  economy  and  society.
Therefore, Europe’s education and training systems are at the heart of the coming changes.
They too, must adapt. (EU 2000: 3; emphasis added)
The conclusion is that, above all, education and training systems must adapt to the
new realities of the 21st century. (Ibid.: 6) 
Europe’s education and training systems need to adapt both to the demands of the
knowledge  society  and  to  the  need  for  an  improved  level  and  quality  of
employment. (European Council 2000: § 25)
5 In these quoted passages, it is above all important to note how the neoliberal framework
is  taken  for  granted.  ‘Social  life’  is  narrowed  down  to  its  economic  features:  the
“knowledge-based  economy”  and  “the  need  for  an  improved  level  and  quality  of
employment.” This implies that knowledge is  defined and consumed by its  monetary
value and that human beings are conceived of and viewed as human capital. Such an
approach is both characteristic of and functional for neoliberalism. As Connell puts it,
Neoliberalism has a definite view of education, understanding it as human capital
formation.  It  is  the  business  of  forming  the  skills  and  attitudes  needed  by  a
productive  workforce  –  productive  in  the  precise  sense  of  producing  an  ever-
growing mass of profits for the market economy. “Human capital” is a metaphor,
and in itself too narrow. However, this economistic idea does catch an important
feature of education, that it is a creative process oriented to the future. (Connell
2013: 104) 
6 Finally, there is no competition between or acknowledgment of different perspectives on
society and education; the competition is occurring within the system, namely, between
schools, teachers and students, and not between different systems or models of society. In
such  a  framework,  individuals  and  institutions  are  required  to  continually  strive  to
enhance their positions as established in various ranking and league tables (cf. Alexander
2011; and Au 2008). From an educational point of view, this implies that the only possible
option  for  education  is  for  it  to  adjust  itself  to  the  system’s  requirements;  as  it  is
explicitly stated that “education and training systems must adapt to the new realities of
the 21st century.” Individuals too, as is made clear, “must adapt to change.” We are not
far from truth in saying that at the very heart of such a stance is the desire to subsume
every educational aim, possibility, or value into its own model. Moreover, such a stance is
predetermined and is evident in itself; it is not a matter of on-going discussion. In this
way, EU “educational” policies, de facto, tend to expropriate subjects and communities of
their knowledge and culture,  denying their legitimacy. We come to see how the EU’s
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notion of education is ultimately exclusive rather than inclusive. At the risk of being
pedantic, I wish to clarify this issue: the EU states that individuals must be included in
educational politics, thus contributing to the development of society – which has more
than a passing similarity to the No Child  Left  Behind act.3 However,  the very problem
resides in the fact that individuals – both children and adults – are not included in the
first place because the EU statement, so to speak, leaves no room for transformations or
transactions  among  individuals  and  environments.  To  be  included,  individuals  must
previously meet certain requirements, and if they do not, they must adjust themselves first
to be included in educational paths. Of course, education also entails socialisation and the
need for judgment, and it is concerned with providing individuals with the necessary
skills  for  living  in  society  –  the  well-known  paradox  of  educational  freedom  and
educational authority (see Biesta 2009, 2010). However, such a strong orientation towards
a  pre-established  qualification  of  individuals  raises  serious  concerns  regarding  the
commitment of education to democracy and newness. To the extent that education is pre-
conceived throughout, it is difficult to envisage how critical agency, which is certainly a
pivotal feature of education, can be pursued.
7 Strong commitments to the labour market and the narrowing down of education – and
living – to its  economic dimension are reinforced in Europe 2020:  A strategy for  smart,
sustainable and inclusive growth. In this document, which forms the basis for EU policies
from 2010 to the next decade, we find the following:
Smart growth:  developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation.  […]
“Youth on the move” to enhance the performance of  education systems and to
facilitate the entry of young people to the labour market. (European Commission
2010: 5) 
To ensure that the competences required to engage in further learning and the
labour market are acquired and recognised throughout general, vocational, higher
and adult education and to develop a common language and operational tool for
education/training and work. (Ibid.: 19)
8 Once again, we find the same implicit assumptions. The only possible option available is
for education to follow and adjust; it is a means of facilitating “the entry of young people
to the labour market”; the first aim of all  actors involved in educational paths is “to
ensure  that  the  competences  required to  engage  in  further  learning  and the  labour
market  are  acquired  and  recognised”  –  which  is  why  education  is  all-consumed  by
learning (cf. Biesta 2006). I wish to highlight that the instrumental value of education is
not only a problem in itself, but it also carries the connotation of an “atomisation” of
education at all levels, thus pushing towards a restriction of educational opportunities, a
concept referenced directly in the following:
Instrumentalism is thus linked to another tendency in neoliberal education policy,
a shift towards individuation or atomisation, whereby educational institutions and
agents are viewed as isolated and distinct elements, with little or no recognition of
how they also comprise larger systems or structures, or of how the meaning of each
can only be understood in relation to that larger whole. This individualisation is
evident  in  the  frequent  lack  of  recognition  of  the  key  role  of  context  in
understanding the work of individuals. (Clark 2012: 300) 
9 Such a process of atomisation is apparent in the EU’s push towards personalised paths for
learning:
Everyone should be able to follow open learning pathways of  their  own choice,
rather than being obliged to follow predetermined routes to specific destinations.
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This  means,  quite  simply,  that  education  and  training  systems  should  adapt  to
individual needs and demands rather than the other way round. (EU 2000: 8) 
10 Although this passage should suggest the adoption of a broader framework on education,
one in which everyone is able to choose and pursue her/his own concept of learning and
education, I believe something different is at work here to the extent that such “open
learning  pathways”  are  to  be  pursued according  to  “the  demands  of  the  knowledge
society and to the need for an improved level and quality of employment” (European
Council  2000:  § 25).  Such  pathways  respond  only  to  the  overall  requirements  of  a
“peculiar” vision of society. In other words, individual pathways are not the means by
which individuals freely choose one way or another, one form of content or another, in
an  open  and  transactional  interaction  with  society  and  environments.  Rather,  such
pathways seem to be the ways in which individuals can best adapt to the pre-specified
requirements of  the neoliberal  vision.  Then,  within the EU framework,  the space for
politics is replaced by a space in which anything can be conceived of and enacted in terms
of  the pre-established services delivered.  The only matters  up for  discussion are the
efficiency and performativity of the system under examination: 
The relationship between the neo-liberal state and its citizens’ has become less a
political  relationship  –  that  is,  a  relationship  between government  and citizens
who, together,  are concerned about the common good – and more an economic
relationship – that is, a relationship between the state as provider and the taxpayer
as consumer of public services. (Biesta 2010: 53-4) 
11 An additional document, Rethinking Education, delivered by the European Commission in
2012, works in the same vein. Its main passages are symptomatic of the EU’s gestures
towards education. Let me quote them:
Rethinking Education was set up in 2012 to reform education systems across the EU
so as to meet growing demand for higher skills levels and reduce unemployment.
What  is  needed?  With  labour  markets  and  the  demand  for  skills  changing,
education systems need to adapt so that they can cope with the rising demand
anticipated over the next decade. (European Commission 2012)
The  European  Commission  will  continue  to  take  action  and  pursue  discussions
designed to ensure that education systems introduce new teaching and learning
methods by 2020 that will enable them to equip students with the right skills for
employment. (Ibid.)
12 The point I wish to make clear is that such a document – like the other quoted above – is
not a framework created for a specific purpose (namely, how education must face its
function of qualification or its commitment to the labour market).  I  do not object to
anything in regards to such a requirement, and it would be an odd opinion indeed if one
were to consider education as extraneous to such a pivotal issue. The problem, as simple
as it is misguided, is that this aim is pursued as the only function that education must
perform. There is nothing wrong with a single institution or some peculiar scholarly
perspective that frames education in such terms – indeed, I am also of course arguing for
a specific educational logic, and I thus, in a sense, restrict education to one specific logic.
However, problems associated with the case exposed here are twofold: a) the institution
of which we are speaking is the EU, which is the major actor in European educational
processes and practices; in other words, one would expect a wide, multidimensional and
inclusive approach from such an institution; and b) in the EU’s documents on education,
we  find  no  trace  of  alternative  perspectives  or,  importantly,  initiatives  aimed  at
discussing and broadening its approach: all educational actors are expected to enact these
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pre-conceived policies. In these sentences a strong erosion of both ethical and democratic
dimensions of education through neoliberal policies is enacted,
any idea of education as a public responsibility and site of democratic and ethical
practice  is  replaced  by  education  as  a  production  process,  a  site  of  technical
practice and a private commodity governed by a means/end logic – summed up,
again, in that supremely technomanagerial question – ‘what works?’  (Fielding &
Moss 2011: 23-4)
Europe is also facing a skills deficit and, during a time of economic crisis, highly-
skilled individuals have a better chance of finding a job. With an estimated 90 % of
jobs requiring digital skills in the near future, it is thus essential that education and
training  systems  provide  individuals  with  the  required  skills.  (European
Commission 2012)
13 Now, to first discuss why a different logic is required, let me make an additional remark.
One of the main features of such a framework, consistent with the neoliberal narrative, is
its tendency to close the loop between the knowledge required to analyse the situation in
which education currently finds itself and the knowledge that education should produce.
The  neoliberal  –  and  EU  –  narrative  tends  to  speak  in  a  detached  and  supposedly
‘objective’ manner in terms of given aims, percentages, tables, data and ‘facts’ that do not
allow any other type of analysis or knowledge to enter the educational debate. Such a
choice in turn works to produce a form of knowledge that is strictly functional to its base
(Ball  2003).  As a  corollary,  because the aims and purposes of  education are given in
advance, critical engagement with educational aims, purposes, and the overall framework
is neither required nor pursued. Most likely, such a politics of learning will bring about
an impoverishment of students’ (and teachers’) critical agency. In what follows, drawing
on Deweyan reflection, I attempt to hint at a different educational logic. 
 
2. Education as Adaptation
14 Thus far, I have attempted to argue against the EU educational framework. Here, to first
explore why and how Deweyan educational thought may be useful in analysing such an
issue while suggesting a different way to conceive of education, let me make an additional
remark about the choice to use a Deweyan framework. I begin, by way of introduction,
with a passage from the Preface to Democracy and Education:
This book  connects  the  growth  of  democracy  with  the  development  of  the
experimental method in the sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences,
and the industrial  reorganization,  and is  concerned to point out the changes in
subject matter and method of education indicated by these developments. (MW 9:
3)
15 The passage, although it is well known to any Deweyan scholar, is useful in clarifying a
question: Dewey’s aim, as we know, was never to address education from an abstract,
‘philosophical’ perspective. Quite on the contrary, in Democracy and Education, Dewey was
concerned time and again with how we must understand education as a “necessity of
[l]ife” (MW 9:  4),  as the title of  Chapter One so powerfully suggests.  According to the
Deweyan framework, education is, above all, a matter of life and death because 
the living thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it none the less tries to
turn the energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence. If it
cannot do so, it does not just split into smaller pieces (at least in the higher forms of
life), but loses its identity as a living thing. (MW 9: 4)
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16 Such a conception of education is not limited to the passage quoted above. On page five,
we find an even bolder statement concerning the need for education: “The primary
ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the constituent members in a social
group determine the necessity of education” (MW 9: 5). Dewey definitely conceived of
education as the basis from which human beings face “the problem of how to engage in
life” (MW 14: 58). Throughout his work, from How We Think to Knowing and the Known,
Dewey clearly recognises the dangers and horrors that dwell in our aleatory world:
Man finds  himself  living  in  an  aleatory  world;  his  existence  involves,  to  put  it
baldly, a gamble. The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily
unstable. Its dangers are irregular, inconstant, not to be counted upon as to their
times  and  seasons.  Although  persistent,  they  are  sporadic,  episodic.  […]  These
things are as true today as they were in the days of early culture. It is not the facts
which  have  changed,  but  the  methods  of  insurance,  regulation  and
acknowledgment. (LW 1: 43-4; emphasis added) 
17 Such a world “genuine hazard” (LW 1: 62) demands effective responses so that human
beings  can  survive.  Human beings,  from their  first  appearance  on  Earth,  have  been
thrown into such an aleatory world. To survive, they have been called on to transform
unsettled and indeterminate situations into ones of more stability and clarity, thereby
finding grounding elements through the flow of experience (LW 12:  186).  For Dewey,
knowledge – and education – are literally a matter of life or death. Thus, in employing a
Deweyan  framework,  we  cannot  be  charged  with  being  removed  from  reality  and
uninterested in the concrete realities of society and education. In what follows then, in
the light of the Deweyan conception of education and democracy, 
I wish to offer some warnings on the weaknesses and risks associated with enacting such
policies. I also wish to show that EU framework is inconsistent and, namely, that it is not
able to perform its own functions. More specifically, in this section I address the first
issue: the EU conception of education as adaptation. 
18 In analysing the account of education Dewey provides in Democracy and Education and in
keeping my goal in mind, we can see that Dewey raises two questions that undermine the
EU framework: a) the extent to which it is possible to give “purely external direction”
(MW 9: 30) to educational processes and practices, and b) the question of the “diversity of
stimulation” (MW 9:  90)  needed to actually  have education.  I  begin with the former
question. The EU’s statements that “individuals must adapt to change” and that “Europe’s
education and training systems” must adapt as well (EU 2000: 3) seem to overestimate
opportunities to externally direct educational paths and processes. Education in the EU
framework is conceived of as a force from above that shapes individuals by “putting them
on the right track” as it were. In my opinion, it is not important if such an approach is
labelled by the EU as good for individuals, society, or both. The very problem lies in the
fact that such a gesture is inconsistent. In other words, it does not fulfil its own purposes.
As Dewey states, in education, 
purely external direction is impossible. The environment can at most only supply
stimuli  to  call  out  responses.  These  responses  proceed from tendencies  already
possessed by the individual. Even when a person is frightened by threats into doing
something, the threats work only because the person has an instinct of fear. If he
has not, or if, though having it, it is under his own control, the threat has no more
influence upon him than light has in causing a person to see who has no eyes. While
the customs and rules of adults furnish stimuli which direct as well as evoke the
activities of the young, the young, after all, participate in the direction which their
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actions finally take. In the strict sense, nothing can be forced upon them or into
them […]. Speaking accurately, all direction is but re-direction. (MW 9: 30)
19 This statement, as often occurs when analysing Deweyan claims, works at different levels:
a) at an educational level, b) at an ethico-political level, and c) at an existential level. With
regards to the educational level, when analysing interactions between individuals and the
environment,  Dewey  focuses  on  the  individual  level.  He  states  that  the  “[t]he
environment can at most only supply stimuli to call out responses” and that “[t]hese
responses proceed from tendencies already possessed by the individual.” Now, it  is  a
given that some of the most Deweyan revolutionary insights come from his challenge to
any  form  of  dualism  and  from  his  transactional view  of  individuals  and  things  as
emerging from shared experience and communication. Nonetheless, it would be fruitful
to focus on the fact that Dewey puts a clear emphasis on the individual angle in this
passage. If I am allowed to interpret such a gesture, I believe that what is at stake here is
not a theoretical stance – in other words, the transactional approach, whereby individual
and society take form together, is not in question. The point rather is an existential and
ethico-political one. The Deweyan call is a warning against any totalising thought or all-
inclusive approach. In other words, it is a call to freedom: “nothing can be forced upon
[young people] or into them.” Even an individual acting “frightened by threats” acts on
“tendencies already possessed by the individual.” This is why “we never educate directly,
but  indirectly  by  means  of  the  environment.”  What  educators  must  do  is  “design
environments for the purpose” (MW 9: 23). The EU, conversely, takes the environment as
a given and then requires the individual to adapt to such an environment by means of
education.  As  we  can  see,  the  EU  turns  education  on  its  head,  thus  simultaneously
limiting both individuals and collective educational possibilities. Such a limitation also
works to undermine EU goals of innovation and achievement because every achievement,
in Deweyan conception,  is  based on personal  commitment  –  the “tendencies  already
possessed by the individual” (MW 9: 30) and “shared common interest” (MW 9: 92), or the
very things that EU educational politics removes. 
20 The same happens when we consider the Deweyan focus on meaning. Although I develop
this point in the following section, I wish to highlight here that Dewey repeatedly draws
our attention to the relationship between meaning creation and shared experience. As he
states, “things gain meaning by being used in a shared experience or joint action” (MW 9:
20). What is important to bear in mind is that such a “shared experience or joint action”
cannot – by definition – be an experience shaped from above in response to pre-specified
demands.  For  sharing  to  occur,  we  need  freedom (the  freedom to  interact  and  the
freedom to project possible aims and goals). In Democracy and Education, Dewey expends
crucial words on meaning creation, going so far as to state that,
There  is  no  limit  to  the  meaning  which  an  action  may  come  to  possess.  It  all
depends upon the context of perceived connections in which it is placed; the reach
of imagination in realizing connections is inexhaustible. (MW 9: 215)
21 In this passage, we come to see how action does not have meaning in itself; action does
not carry any meaning because “it all depends upon the context of perceived connections
in  which  it  is  placed.”  In  other  words,  the  human capacity  to  create  meaning  –  in
Deweyan words, “the capacity for constantly expanding the range and accuracy of one’s
perception  of  meanings”  (MW 9:  130)  –  is  potentially  inexhaustible.  A  limitation  in
connections  flows  inevitably  from  narrowing  down  the  creation  and  perception  of
meaning, namely, in narrowing down the broadening of “the meaning-horizon” (MW 9:
84) that Dewey so powerfully calls for.
Narrowing Down Education
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-1 | 2016
8
22 Such narrowing down has strong effects on the subject as well. If, according to Dewey,
“the self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through
choice of action […] [and] the generous self consciously identifies itself with the full range
of relationships implied in its activity” (MW 9: 361-2), then by limiting the choices the self
can effect and its range of relationships, the EU ends up also limiting the contribution
that the self can make to the formation and development of society. This point leads me




23 While  one could argue that  the  individuation of  educational  processes  and practices
pursued by the EU constitutes a step towards the free and open development of learning
possibilities – in the end one can claim that individuals are able to choose what, when and
how to learn through such a path – it is my contention that this gesture entails a strong
limitation  on  educational  possibilities,  both  individual  and  social,  and  that  such  a
freedom is only an ostensible one. In this section, I wish to argue that the EU’s gesture
entails the restriction of an individual’s educational opportunities and even a threat to
democratic society as a whole. 
24 The atomisation of educational practices affects two related levels: a) the level at which
individuals and society shape one another and at which, in a sense, both come into the
world together; and b) the level at which meaning arises. The first level is one of the most
frequently analysed by Deweyan scholars. One of the most important insights of Dewey’s
transactional approach is his account of democracy as “primarily a mode of associated
living, of conjoint communicated experience” (MW 9: 93). Through such a mode, as we
know, through “more numerous and more varied points of contact” between people who
share interests and stimuli, “a liberation of powers” (MW 9: 93) is achieved. This occurs
because “[t]he individual in his isolation is nothing; only in and through an absorption of
the aims and meaning of organized institutions does he attain true personality” (MW 9:
101). Thus, it is in a sense surprising how the cradle of democracy lacks such a pivotal
dimension in its  educational  processes.  In what follows,  however,  I  wish to focus on
another unfortunate outcome of atomisation,  an outcome that affects the creation of
meanings. Let us pay attention to the following passage:
There  is  no  limit  to  the  meaning  which  an  action  may  come  to  possess.  It  all
depends upon the context of perceived connections in which it is placed; the reach
of imagination in realizing connections is inexhaustible. (MW 9: 215)
25 Here we come to see how action, namely the “most basic category” (Biesta & Barbules
2003: 9) of the Deweyan approach, has no meaning in itself. Of course, actions are enacted
in determinate contexts aimed at realising determined purposes. However, this does not
complete the meaning of our actions. In Deweyan terms, meanings are always open to
further creation/interpretation (Garrison 1996). However, at the very same time, they are
always  at  risk  of  collapsing,  of  imploding,  or  of  being consumed.  Importantly,  these
meanings may be unlimited.  Education,  for  Dewey,  is  also the means through which
human life gains its ever-open and ever-possible meaning. The problem is that such an
ever-present potentiality of further meanings can be enacted only when imaginations can
realise actual connections, as such a potentiality depends on “the context of perceived
connections in which it is placed.” Stated negatively, when such connections are impeded
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or  removed,  the  creation  of  meanings  is  curtailed  as  well.  Such  an  atomisation  of
educational practices and processes also threatens thinking itself. Despite the grouping of
thinking and reflective thought that has largely appeared in interpretations of his work,
Dewey highlights in several passages how thinking entails an inescapable uncertainty at
its core. In his words, “to consider the bearing of the occurrence upon what may be, but is
not yet, is to think” (MW 9: 153). Such an uncertainty, faithful to his philosophy, also
constitutes the door to growth and education: the possibility, in Granger’s words, “[to]
liberate and expand the potential meanings of things” (Granger 2006: 7).
26 A number of scholars have analysed meaning creation in Deweyan work. Due to space
restrictions, I wish to linger only on the relationships between meaning, possibilities and
newness.  To  make  my  point  I  will  draw  from  Garrison’s,  Granger’s  and  Waks’
(converging) accounts.
27 In a 1994 article, Jim Garrison, in discussing the function of art, states, “the ‘truth’ of art,
of poetry, is that it can disclose the beauty of meaningful possibilities that are concealed
beneath the mask of the actual, the ordinary, the everyday” (Garrison 1994: 3). He then
goes on to state that such a function pursued by “expansive imagination” is essential for
freedom to exist: 
A lack of imagination and thereby a sense of possibility is the greatest oppression
there is. It is here that any critical and transformational theory of education must
take its departure […]. Without an expansive imagination, one willing to go beyond
approved limits, it is impossible to be free. (Ibid.: 3)
28 It is crucial to bear in mind that freedom, according to Dewey, serves as the basis from
which we can conceive of communication, democracy and growth. Without the possibility
of expanding freedom, all Deweyan work would end in emptiness. In fact, we can even say
that his work constitutes a continuous endeavour to understand and expand freedom and
its conditions.
29 The expansion of  meanings  is  also  the  point  of  departure  of  Granger’s  account:  “In
learning to conduct more of everyday experience in an artful manner, we increase our
ability to liberate and expand the potential meanings of things” (Granger 2006: 7). By
integrating art into everyday experience, the world comes to be presented “in a new and
different perspective” (Ibid.: 104). This different perspective is also Waks’ point. In his
“Agency  and  Arts:  John  Dewey’s  Contribution  to  Pragmatic  Cosmopolitanism,”  Waks
highlights  the  role  of  art  as  the  “channel  for  spontaneous,  pre-rationalized  initial
expressions of the ‘whole’ person” (Waks 2009: 120) and as an essential component in the
“opening  [of]  new  vistas  and  widening  perception”  (Ibid.:  121).  According  to  Waks’
account, art is important both to overcome separation within a subject’s experience and
to foresee unnoticed perspectives.
30 Such a possibility is quintessentially pedagogical to the extent to which we conceive of
education as the means by which we may pursue and welcome newness (see Garrison
1996,  2005;  Biesta  2006,  2007).  Now,  it  is  worthy  to  note  that  Dewey  conceives  of
“imaginative experience” and education along the same lines; an imaginative experience
“is what happens when varied materials of sense quality, emotions and meanings come
together in a union that marks a new birth in the world” (LW 10: 272). Moreover, he
writes:
A sense of possibilities that are unrealized and that might be realized are, when
they are put in contrast with actual conditions, the most penetrating “criticism” of
the latter that can be made. It is by a sense of possibilities opening before us that
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we become aware of constrictions that hem us in and of burdens that oppress. (LW
10: 349)
31 Such an account goes hand in hand with the Deweyan interpretation of education as an
“emancipation and enlargement of experience” (MW 6: 301). Such an “emancipation and
enlargement  of  experience,”  following  Garrison,  Granger  and  Waks’  converging
interpretations, simultaneously welcomes newness (or, in Deweyan terms, “a new birth in
the world”) and the recovery of the unity of the subject’s experience.
32 There is also another question at stake: the “diversity of stimulation” (MW 9: 90) that is
needed to actually have education. Let us pay attention to the following passage:
Diversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to thought.
The more activity is restricted to a few definite lines as it is when there are rigid
class lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences – the more action tends to
become routine on the part of the class at a disadvantage, and capricious, aimless,
and explosive on the part of the class having the materially fortunate position. (MW
9: 90)
33 Here,  Dewey furnishes  in advance a  strong critique of  the EU neoliberal  educational
framework.  In  this  passage,  the  lack  of  “diversity  of  stimulation”  is  potentially
“explosive.”  In  Deweyan  educational  philosophy,  equilibrium  can  only  be  attained
through growth. 
34 This passage is  even more interesting when considering its final  section.  The lack of
“diversity of stimulation” and “adequate interplay of experiences” is not only damaging
to those socially or economically disadvantaged;  importantly,  it  is  also dangerous for
those who assume a “materially fortunate position.” In other words,  such a lack is a
threat to society as a whole. This is why Dewey states that,
the intellectual variations of the individual in observation, imagination, judgment,
and invention are simply the agencies of social progress, just as conformity to habit
is the agency of social conservation. (MW 9: 306)
35 The individualisation and atomisation of educational processes and practices pursued by
the EU also implies a progressive eclipse of the democratic and ethical dimensions of
educational processes and practices. I wish to make clear from the outset that I am not
claiming that the EU has no ethics or sense of democracy; that would be a senseless claim.
My point is,  of course, slightly more nuanced, touching on the (hidden) ethics of the
neoliberal  framework  and  the  current  lack  of  democracy  in  education.  The  “open
learning pathways” (EU 2000:  8)  towards which EU calls  for,  most likely work to cut
possibilities to concretely share contents, ways of learning and individual’s choices. The
public dimension of educational processes is, then, severely reduced by EU educational
politics in that EU does not work to promote public debates about the aims of education.
Such  aims,  in  fact,  are  pre-established,  along  with  the  overall  framework  in  which
individuals  as  well  as  institutions  are  called  to  think  and  act.  Individual  needs  and
demands, too, are only conceived of in such a neo-liberal framework, thus denying the
ethical dimension of educational processes, one in which the debate about the ends of
education is promoted and sustained.
36 To cut to the chase, the problem with the EU framework is that it presents itself as unique
and inevitable. Then we only have an appearance of openness. The EU choice of a specific
concept of education is not presented as an – ethical – choice, but as a matter of fact.
Additionally, educational actors and institutions are required to follow pre-determined
paths. There is no dynamic coming from below, where below are educators, teachers and
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students. Moreover, despite several claims made about the connections between training
and society’s challenges, it is all too clear how such connections will be enacted based on
a determinate economic vision of society. The problem with this lies not so much in the
specific lens chosen, but in the very fact that such a broad institution adopts only one
lens on education, thus erasing other approaches. Again, it is here worth quoting Dewey
at length: 
In final account, then, not only does social life demand teaching and learning for its
own permanence, but the very process of living together educates. It enlarges and
enlightens  experience;  it  stimulates  and  enriches  imagination;  it  creates
responsibility for accuracy and vividness of statement and thought. A man really
living alone (alone mentally as well as physically) would have little or no occasion
to reflect upon his past experience to extract its net meaning. (MW 9: 9)
37 Then, if education also entails the enhancement of social progress and transformation,
“novelty” and the “diversity of stimulation” must be considered key educational features.
38 Education is the place where our lives and the life of society take form. When we conceive
of education from a pre-established stance, we conceive of living before living can show
its own possibilities. Society functions in the same way. In fostering only one concept of
education, we crystallise, so to speak, the current form of society and existing power
relationships.  Thus,  education,  to  the  extent  that  it  is  concerned  with  freedom and
justice,  must also be concerned with otherness and possibilities and namely with the
space that has not yet been thought of.  However,  to the extent that the meaning of
education lies in transformation and that education is concerned with justice, education
must  be  concerned  with  the  ungraspable  openness  of  our  thought.  Education  must
demand work to go beyond what we and society currently are. As educators, we must
continually ask whether our views of education are inclusive and good enough to meet
and manage this challenge. Through such engagement, without challenging given “forms
of  life,”  education  is  at  risk  of  becoming  a  means  of  facilitating  the  progressive
impoverishment of living and the perpetuation of injustice and inequality into the future.
39 This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  the  relationship  between the  real  nature  of  today’s
economy and the fairy tale version of it, though opportunities to create new processes in
the globalised world are, in my view, intentionally overstated. That globalisation has led
to a larger space for creativity in education and in the workplace at  large is  all  too
apparent.  The weight  of  international  associations such as  the EU,  with their  strong
influence on countries, and increasing levels economic inequality point in the opposite
direction. The real decisions on education are most likely made by fewer people than in
the recent past. The EU, for example, hardly creates a space for sharing knowledge and
experience on education, as such a space starts with teachers, educators, and key local
actors  in  the  field  of  schooling  and  education.  Rather,  the  EU  aims  to  govern  the
educational  process  through  pervasive  penetration  into  schools,  educational
departments, government agencies dedicated to education, and families. This approach is
a mistake, and not merely from a humanistic and old-fashioned perspective. 
40 I am concerned with the fact that when education is virtually narrowed down to just one
function  –  i.e.,  employability  –  we  lose  sight  of  the  variety,  complexity  and
unpredictability of life and education. In other words, I hold nothing against a call for the
usefulness of educational paths – from a Deweyan perspective, doing so would be an odd
gesture. My main concern lies in the way and extent to which such usefulness is to be
conceived. My point is that if education is required to respond only to specific demands of
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the labour market, thus producing a predetermined set of skills, it then fails to prepare
individuals for the declared future and challenges. The EU should be aware that newness,
the challenging of perspectives, and shared interests are essential, not only to education
but also to the development of society, which depends on the presence of variety, as
biology and social sciences as well have shown, throughout the past two centuries, time
and again.
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NOTES
1. References to John Dewey’s published works are to the critical edition, The Collected Works of
John Dewey,  1882-1953,  edited by Boydston J. A.,  Carbondale and Edwardsville,  Southern Illinois
University Press, 1967-1991, and published in three series as The Early Works 1882-1899 [EW], The
Middle Works 1899-1924 [MW], and The Later Works 1925-1953 [LW].
2. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Murphy 2003; and Keeling 2006.
3. The 2001 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in the U.S.
ABSTRACTS
At  least  since  the  Lisbon  Memorandum  on  Lifelong  Learning,  European  education  has  been
increasingly framed in terms of  a neoliberal  rallying cry.  Such a gesture has widely affected
education  and  schooling  in  Europe  and  has  pushed  educational  institutions  and  processes
towards a significant transformation. Such a transformation – and this is my point – is anything
but benign: it implies a lack of invaluable educational features such as critical agency, democratic
sharing, and meaning creation. In this paper, I wish to address this issue in the light of Dewey’s
thought  and  philosophy  of  education,  mainly  in  reference  to  his  masterpiece  Democracy  and
Education.  In  particular,  drawing  from  the  Deweyan  conception  of  democracy  and  meaning
creation,  I  wish  to  argue  that  a  different  conception  of  education,  where  education  is  not
rationed,  individualised or  commodified,  is  required.  I  also argue that  the EU framework on
education is inconsistent, as it is not able to fulfil its own goals. By enacting the EU educational
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